DMA, Natural Kinds, Possible Worlds, and Other Fun Stuff

Well it has been a few weeks since my last post and for that I am sorry. I will post about Aquinas today, but first, here is some stuff about my personal research.

I am currently taking a seminar on analytic metaphysics with Robert Garcia here at TAMU, and it is a great class. The main topic is properties, although God and universals has been all the rage of late. I am working on a paper in which I investigate one contemporary metaphysician's (DM Armstrong) treatment of natural kinds.

David Malet Armstrong, or DMA, claims to follow Aristotle on immanent universals--where universals exist in the things in which they are instantiated--while denying the existence of natural kinds. However, I find DMA to not follow Aristotle very much at all, other than ascribing to immanent universals.

DMA is a self-proclaimed naturalist who believes that science will give us (someday) the "fundamental book of physics" in which is laid out the primary divisions in nature. I think that DMA's view runs into issues when he has to deal with everyday examples in metaphysics.

If there are no natural kinds, then,  according to DMA, the "kinds" in nature merely supervene on the ontologically fundamental categories of being--namely properties and bare particulars. But then it seems like all we can say about the difference between a human being and a polar bear is that each "state-of-affairs" is alike insofar as it is the combination of a bare particular and properties, and therefore the properties alone differentiate us from the polar bear. Furthermore, a fetus or a mentally handicapped person both are human beings for an A-T (Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas) theorist; for DMA, if we differentiate based on properties then it seems like the fetus or the mentally handicapped person is not the same "kind" as the healthy human being since they lack many of the properties of the latter .

Property talk is often misguided in contemporary metaphysics. It is often assumed that any "thing" is a bundle of properties plus a bare particular; but for the Scholastic following Aristotle, a property is a proper accident flowing from the essence of a thing. 

Directly related to this discussion is that of possible worlds in metaphysics. This tradition traces back to the Rationalist Liebniz and is all the rage today. The basic idea is that when trying to decide what is possible for any given thing--say a dog--we ask ourselves if there is a possible world in which the dog has this different property. Now, it is obviously more complicated than that, but this is the basic point.

But, as Edward Feser and others have pointed out with great clarity, possible world talk gets things backwards. Possibility is logically related to what is actual--in order to discuss what might be possible for the dog, we have to know about dogs. Seems obvious, right?

For example, the possible worlds lover might say that it is not possible for a dog to write a book because in no possible world do dogs write books. On the flip side, one might argue that in fact it is possible that a dog write a book since there are infinitely many possible worlds and therefore there must be one in which a dog writes a book.

Think about this reasoning.

The first response presupposes an understanding of the essence or nature of dogs--and therefore possibility is grounded in the actual dog, meaning that, given the nature of a dog, certain things are possible. The second response is just wrong.

Possible worlds talk might be useful when discussing the intrinsic and extrinsic potentialities of a thing, but it is only useful when the thing in question is understood.

Possibility is not grounded by possible worlds, but rather it is grounded in the nature or essence of things, and therefore it is ultimately grounded by God, since He is the Creator of all things.

So as you can see, I like Feser, dislike possible worlds for the grounding of possibility, and I don't think that DMA is very Aristotelian. Cheers.

Univocally, Equivocally, Analogously?

In question 13 of the Summa, Aquinas discusses the names of God. I think that the most important aspect of this question is the discussion of the relationship between names of creatures and names of God--specifically whether or not we can apply the same name, in the same sense (equivocation), to God.

Per the usual, Aquinas begins article 5 of Question 13 with objections, one of which is:

"Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, videtur quod aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis vocatur.
Let us make man to our image and likeness (Gen. 1:26), it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally".

From this biblical quote it is clear that human beings are made in the likeness of God, so how could a term not apply in the same way both to God and man? If we cannot use the same words between creature and Creator, then how can we know we are "made in His likeness"?

Aquinas argues that since univocation between certain creatures is impossible, then we cannot speak of God univocally. The distance between any two creatures is, by definition, smaller than the distance between God and His creatures. Now, distance in this sense is not literal, but rather in the order of dependence, a sort of metaphysical or ontological "distance". The relationship between Creator and creature is that of necessity to contingency; the relationship between any two creatures is a matter of only contingent beings. Therefore, if univocation is not possible between some creatures, then it is certainly not possible between God and His creation. Furthermore, even if univocation was possible between all creatures then it does not follow that univocation between God and creatures is possible.

This is all a bit heavy. It gets easier, I think.

Take the term "wise". When we say "that man is wise" we are pointing to some aspect of that man, distinct from the essence of the man, or even distinct from the powers or existence of that man. Now, when we say that "God is wise", we cannot mean this.

As earlier proven (Q.11), the essence of God is to exist, and He is ultimately simple by Nature. Therefore, we cannot possible "point" to something distinct from God's essence in the same way that we do when we call some person wise or well-mannered.

BUT....this cannot mean that we only speak of God equivocally, always the same word but never in the same sense, otherwise we cannot be said to ever say anything about God, and Aquinas clearly thinks that natural reason allows us to arrive at certain truths about God.

Therefore, we must use analogy.

Whereas equivocal terms are identical in form but diverse in meaning, and univocal terms are identical in form and meaning or idea, an analogous term is not identical in meaning, but neither is it diverse--it is, as Aquinas so aptly puts:

"sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum 
but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing" (13.5).

This third way allows for us to speak of God in terms that we know.

Aquinas saves the day, again.

Whether God is One?

In question 11 of the Summa, Aquinas discusses the unity of God. I will focus on article 3: Whether God is One? (Ia.11.3).

As usual, Aquinas begins the article with objections to the notion of God being One: "One, as the principle number, cannot be predicated of God". Furthermore, it is said in Corinthians that "there are many gods and many lords"(1 Cor 8:5).

But, as I have come to expect, Aquinas does have an answer to this fundamental question of the number of God, whether He is one or many.

"Respondeo dicendum quod Deum esse unum, ex tribus demonstratur"  (I answer that it can be shown from these three sources that God is One).

1. From God's simplicity we know that God is One. Aquinas gives an example of Socrates being a man: being a man is predicated of both Socrates and many other men, but being Socrates is predicated of only one, namely Socrates. In this way it is clear that Socrates is a particular member of the human race. But in the case of God, He is His own nature, as shown in Ia.3.3, and therefore it is impossible that many gods could exist. 
2. By definition and as proved in Ia.4.2, within God is contained the perfection of being. Now, if many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from one another otherwise they would not be many. Furthermore, there would be things that would belong to one which did not belong to another; if a privation, one of them would not be perfect, and if a perfection, then one of them would be without it as they must differ from one another necessarily. Therefore, it is impossible that many gods exist and we know that God must be one.
3. The unity of the world necessitates one first cause of order. We see that everything that exists serves some purpose and creates some harmony. A diverse cause or beginning would lead to a diverse end, leading to discord and chaos. This is not what we see in the world. Therefore, we know that what was the first cause was one, since it is the sole necessary cause. In this way we know that God is One.

Aquinas has done it again. He has a knack for taking very loaded objections to the foundation of the Catholic Faith and dismissing them concisely and completely. One key to remember is that this question does not stand alone, but it rests on previously defined truths that all serve as an "arsenal" for future questions.

But this is the beauty of what Aquinas accomplished.

He was able to start from the most basic--yet also profound--truth of God's existence and then move to uncovering what we can know about God. 

On a personal note, I recently decided who I would be working with on my thesis project here at TAMU. Dr. Robert Garcia and I will be working on the topic of natural kinds in contemporary analytic metaphysics; I am hoping to show how the Scholastics (like Aquinas) had a better metaphysical picture, so to speak, than the contemporary heavyweights like D.M. Armstrong.

I should be blogging rather regularly now, Wednesdays and Sundays. Anyways, until next time...cheers.

Goodness and Being: Question 5

In question 5 of prima pars (Ia), Aquinas discusses the relationship between goodness and being. I want to focus on article 1 and 3: whether goodness differs from being and whether every being is good, respectively.

The notion of the good is key for Aristotle and likewise for Aquinas as he himself draws so much from the Philosopher. The first objection is that since we call them by different names--goodness and being--then they must be different. Another objection comes from the idea that goodness can be had more or less whereas one either is or is not.

Aquinas answers: Augustinus dicit...quod inquantum sumus boni sumus (Augustine says that inasmuch as we exist we are good).

But what does this mean?

Goodness and being differ only in thought, according to Aquinas. We say that what is good is desirable; a thing is only desirable insofar as it is perfect, and a thing is perfect so far as it is actual. Nothing can be perfect if not actual, nothing can be good if not desirable, and we know that we desire things insofar as they are perfect.Therefore goodness is the same as being.

This might seem odd as a conclusion, and, admittedly, it is something that makes more sense given the context of the Summa. However, this idea that goodness and being are one and the same does shed light on the next article I will discuss: whether every being is good.

The main objection to every being being good is the existence of evil: "But some things are called evil. Therefore every being is not good" (Ia.5.3). On the face of it, this objection seems insurmountable, but Aquinas has an answer.

Everything that exists is either God or His creatures; everything that exists can be said to be in act, which as we found from article 1, means that every being is good insofar as it is in act. To quote Aquinas, "Unde sequitur omnes ens, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum est" (Hence is follows that every being as such is good) Ia.5.3.

But then what exactly is evil? It seems that it does, in fact, exist, so it must be accounted for.

Aquinas, following Aristotle, views evil as a lacking or privation. This is key to Catholic dogma as well as Aquinas' overall philosophical picture. It seems like a strange answer, but if you think about the "evils" we perceive in the world then it starts to make sense.

An eye is "evil" if it lacks to power to see; a man is called evil if he lacks some virtue; etc. Aquinas' solution is the result of a discussion of being, which he takes from Aristotle. Since being or actuality is inherently good, then it makes perfect sense to attribute non-being to the opposite of good, which we call evil. Therefore evil can only be understood as a privation as it has no existence.

Nothing is actually evil, since what is actual has being, and what has being is good insofar as it exists.

This understanding of evil is often criticized or rejected, but I think that this solution to the problem of evil not only has withstood the test of time, but that it also remains the only tenable view.

Cheers.

The Existence of God: Aquinas' 5 Ways

I will not be blogging daily, but I will be reading through the Summa daily, so I will have to pick and choose what to blog about.

First, a few points on the overall structure of this work: there are 3 parts to the Summa and each part of the Summa is broken up by questions, and each question has a number of articles. Each article consists of a few objections followed by Aquinas' general response to the question and a particular adversus to each raised objection. When I cite the Summa, it be in the format of part number, question number, and article number (ex. "Ia.3.6").

Unfortunately, every question and article in the Summa is more than worthy material--this makes the choice tough. Today, I will focus on Question 2 article 3: Whether God Exists?

Any student in philosophy has heard of "Aquinas' 5 Ways" for the existence of God, but not every student actually reads the primary source. It is rather incredible to think that these proofs for the existence of God--which are very famous--are RIGHT HERE IN QUESTION 2 of the Summa!

The first way is often called "the first Mover" argument and it goes as follows:

• In the world, things are in motion; whatever is in motion is put in motion by another.
• Motion is nothing but the "reduction of something from potentiality to actuality" (Ia.2.3); nothing can be moved in this way except by something already in act.
• A fire that is actually hot makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot--thereby moving and changing it to a state of "actually being hot". Furthermore, that which is actually hot cannot also, at the same time, be potentially hot. Therefore it is impossible that the same thing be both mover and moved in the same respect, and we know that whatever is in motion is put into motion by another.
• There cannot be an infinite chain of movers because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, there would be no other movers. Subsequent movers move insofar as they were put into motion by the first mover.
• Therefore a first mover exists and was moved by no other; this first mover we call God.

The second way is related to the mover argument, but instead focuses on efficient causality: 

• We find that the world is full of efficient causes.
• These efficient causes cannot be causes of themselves, since it would require them to be prior to themselves, which is impossible.
• Efficient causes follow from order, and it is therefore impossible to go on to infinity: the first cause is the cause of the intermediate cause (which may be many), and the intermediate is that of the ultimate cause. Take away the first cause, and you take away all its effects.
• We know that intermediate and ultimate causes exist. Therefore a first cause must exist. 
• This first efficient cause we call God.

The third way is that of the nature of necessity and contingency:

• We find things in nature that are possible to be and likewise possible not to be.
• Something which is possible to not be must, at some time, not be; therefore if everything is possible to not be, then at some time, nothing existed. But if this were true, and nothing existed at some time, then nothing could ever come to exist since we know that things come to exist by things already existing.
• Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist some whose existence is necessary and therefore not possible to not exist.
• A truly necessary being must exist without being dependent upon another for existence; this necessary being we call God.

The fourth way is an argument from "gradation":

• We see things all around us that are "good", "true", and "hot" and other such predicates; some are "more or less-ly" predicated in different things, but they all resemble some maximum.
• Now, "the maximum of any genus is the cause of all in that genus" (Ia.2.3). 
• Therefore, there must be something which is, to all beings, the cause of goodness, truth, heat, etc. and every other perfection--we call this being God.

The fifth and final way is often misunderstood; it is the argument from design:

• We see things in nature that lack intelligence, yet act in such as way as to exhibit design. Things act towards some end almost without fail.
• Whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards that end without being directed by some intelligence as "the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer" (Ia.2.3).
• Some intelligent being exists as the source of all of nature's directedness and we call this being God.

Let this all soak in...

I said that the design argument is often misunderstood for a reason. William Paley has an argument that he thinks is similar: suppose you stumble upon a watch on a beach and you had never seen a watch before; even suppose that the watch is broken and does not tell time--would you not still suspect that this watch is different in kind from a stone on the beach? The watch seems to be ordered or directed towards some end, and we see this in the little parts that all come together to serve a unified and intelligible purpose. Paley suggests that this is like the universe: we see design in the form of parts working together as wholes to serve some end, and while there are imperfections in the design, it is designed nonetheless.

Here is my issue with this: Aquinas is talking about internal/intrinsic final causality. Paley's watch example is completely different. A watch is not designed in the same way that an acorn is: the watch is artificial and has been artificially given a purpose. The acorn and the "design" Aquinas is speaking of does not require a watchmaker, but rather he is emphasizing the fact that things in nature that lack intelligence are nonetheless directed towards the same types of respective ends almost without fail, and the things themselves can achieve those ends on their own: the acorn can become an oak due to its very nature.

Much more on this later. Cheers.

The "System?" of St. Thomas

THIS IS IT. I have officially started my first blog. I was a double major in Philosophy and English as an undergrad, yet somehow I managed to avoid this experience.

A little about me first. I am a Master's student in philosophy at Texas A&M University. I grew up in Kansas City, MO, where I met my wife, Rachel. My interests in philosophy are a bit diverse, but primarily in metaphysics and Aquinas.

Which leads us to this blog....

St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae is perhaps the most important text in philosophy ever written and it is rarely utilized in philosophy today. The concepts in this extensive work are the foundation of Catholic thought and many of these philosophical tenets originate from the thought of ancient Greece, particularly from Plato and Aristotle. The works of Aquinas were condemned by the Catholic church in 1277 due to their relation to pagan thought.

But this precisely was the wisdom of St. Thomas.

He understood that truth was not dependent upon its adherent, but rather truth was objective and available to all men through reason. Of course, certain truths must be illuminated by grace, but Aquinas, like Aristotle, knew the place of natural reason. Aquinas used the substantial groundwork laid down by The Philosopher (Aquinas attributes this great title to Aristotle) to formulate arguably the most comprehensive "system" in all of philosophy. But is it a system? Is it the "Thomistic System"?

Dr. Morris, a professor at Rockhurst University and a friend, emphasized that the philosophy of Aquinas is just that: the philosophy of Aquinas. If it were a system, it would imply that the philosophy of Aquinas is a "possibility" that we can abstractly "fit" into some framework that is more fundamental--but this cuts at the heart of St. Thomas Aquinas' life project. Aquinas did not spend his life composing some system of philosophy; instead, he spent his life trying to describe reality and seek out the truth. What we learn from the Summa (et. al.) is how things are. A system of philosophy implies that it can be unplugged and tweaked to sort-of "fit" the way we think the world works, or is.

The philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas is not a system, although many contemporary philosophers call it such. Scholasticism is making a comeback of sorts in contemporary analytic philosophy precisely due to its appeal to clarity and its inherent complexity. However, while this is "good press" for Aquinas, it is misguided; it is all too easy to read into Aquinas and take away whatever is convenient. I will try to study Aquinas as a Scholastic, Catholic philosopher, which means that I will not buy into the analytic appeal to logic.

While important, an emphasis on logical structure seems to miss the mark; Aquinas took care with his distinctions, but they were not the fundamental point of his philosophy. What is fundamental to Aquinas' philosophy is, in fact, the Catholic faith. For Aquinas, reason gets us so far and we must rely on Revelation to take us beyond the constraints of natural reason and philosophical inquiry. More on this later...

Well, I hope that I have not lost too many potential subscribers at this point. If you like this post, I promise you will like this blog. Cheers!