Goodness and Being: Question 5

In question 5 of prima pars (Ia), Aquinas discusses the relationship between goodness and being. I want to focus on article 1 and 3: whether goodness differs from being and whether every being is good, respectively.

The notion of the good is key for Aristotle and likewise for Aquinas as he himself draws so much from the Philosopher. The first objection is that since we call them by different names--goodness and being--then they must be different. Another objection comes from the idea that goodness can be had more or less whereas one either is or is not.

Aquinas answers: Augustinus dicit...quod inquantum sumus boni sumus (Augustine says that inasmuch as we exist we are good).

But what does this mean?

Goodness and being differ only in thought, according to Aquinas. We say that what is good is desirable; a thing is only desirable insofar as it is perfect, and a thing is perfect so far as it is actual. Nothing can be perfect if not actual, nothing can be good if not desirable, and we know that we desire things insofar as they are perfect.Therefore goodness is the same as being.

This might seem odd as a conclusion, and, admittedly, it is something that makes more sense given the context of the Summa. However, this idea that goodness and being are one and the same does shed light on the next article I will discuss: whether every being is good.

The main objection to every being being good is the existence of evil: "But some things are called evil. Therefore every being is not good" (Ia.5.3). On the face of it, this objection seems insurmountable, but Aquinas has an answer.

Everything that exists is either God or His creatures; everything that exists can be said to be in act, which as we found from article 1, means that every being is good insofar as it is in act. To quote Aquinas, "Unde sequitur omnes ens, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum est" (Hence is follows that every being as such is good) Ia.5.3.

But then what exactly is evil? It seems that it does, in fact, exist, so it must be accounted for.

Aquinas, following Aristotle, views evil as a lacking or privation. This is key to Catholic dogma as well as Aquinas' overall philosophical picture. It seems like a strange answer, but if you think about the "evils" we perceive in the world then it starts to make sense.

An eye is "evil" if it lacks to power to see; a man is called evil if he lacks some virtue; etc. Aquinas' solution is the result of a discussion of being, which he takes from Aristotle. Since being or actuality is inherently good, then it makes perfect sense to attribute non-being to the opposite of good, which we call evil. Therefore evil can only be understood as a privation as it has no existence.

Nothing is actually evil, since what is actual has being, and what has being is good insofar as it exists.

This understanding of evil is often criticized or rejected, but I think that this solution to the problem of evil not only has withstood the test of time, but that it also remains the only tenable view.

Cheers.