Univocally, Equivocally, Analogously?

In question 13 of the Summa, Aquinas discusses the names of God. I think that the most important aspect of this question is the discussion of the relationship between names of creatures and names of God--specifically whether or not we can apply the same name, in the same sense (equivocation), to God.

Per the usual, Aquinas begins article 5 of Question 13 with objections, one of which is:

"Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, videtur quod aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis vocatur.
Let us make man to our image and likeness (Gen. 1:26), it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally".

From this biblical quote it is clear that human beings are made in the likeness of God, so how could a term not apply in the same way both to God and man? If we cannot use the same words between creature and Creator, then how can we know we are "made in His likeness"?

Aquinas argues that since univocation between certain creatures is impossible, then we cannot speak of God univocally. The distance between any two creatures is, by definition, smaller than the distance between God and His creatures. Now, distance in this sense is not literal, but rather in the order of dependence, a sort of metaphysical or ontological "distance". The relationship between Creator and creature is that of necessity to contingency; the relationship between any two creatures is a matter of only contingent beings. Therefore, if univocation is not possible between some creatures, then it is certainly not possible between God and His creation. Furthermore, even if univocation was possible between all creatures then it does not follow that univocation between God and creatures is possible.

This is all a bit heavy. It gets easier, I think.

Take the term "wise". When we say "that man is wise" we are pointing to some aspect of that man, distinct from the essence of the man, or even distinct from the powers or existence of that man. Now, when we say that "God is wise", we cannot mean this.

As earlier proven (Q.11), the essence of God is to exist, and He is ultimately simple by Nature. Therefore, we cannot possible "point" to something distinct from God's essence in the same way that we do when we call some person wise or well-mannered.

BUT....this cannot mean that we only speak of God equivocally, always the same word but never in the same sense, otherwise we cannot be said to ever say anything about God, and Aquinas clearly thinks that natural reason allows us to arrive at certain truths about God.

Therefore, we must use analogy.

Whereas equivocal terms are identical in form but diverse in meaning, and univocal terms are identical in form and meaning or idea, an analogous term is not identical in meaning, but neither is it diverse--it is, as Aquinas so aptly puts:

"sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum 
but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing" (13.5).

This third way allows for us to speak of God in terms that we know.

Aquinas saves the day, again.