Univocally, Equivocally, Analogously?

In question 13 of the Summa, Aquinas discusses the names of God. I think that the most important aspect of this question is the discussion of the relationship between names of creatures and names of God--specifically whether or not we can apply the same name, in the same sense (equivocation), to God.

Per the usual, Aquinas begins article 5 of Question 13 with objections, one of which is:

"Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, videtur quod aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis vocatur.
Let us make man to our image and likeness (Gen. 1:26), it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally".

From this biblical quote it is clear that human beings are made in the likeness of God, so how could a term not apply in the same way both to God and man? If we cannot use the same words between creature and Creator, then how can we know we are "made in His likeness"?

Aquinas argues that since univocation between certain creatures is impossible, then we cannot speak of God univocally. The distance between any two creatures is, by definition, smaller than the distance between God and His creatures. Now, distance in this sense is not literal, but rather in the order of dependence, a sort of metaphysical or ontological "distance". The relationship between Creator and creature is that of necessity to contingency; the relationship between any two creatures is a matter of only contingent beings. Therefore, if univocation is not possible between some creatures, then it is certainly not possible between God and His creation. Furthermore, even if univocation was possible between all creatures then it does not follow that univocation between God and creatures is possible.

This is all a bit heavy. It gets easier, I think.

Take the term "wise". When we say "that man is wise" we are pointing to some aspect of that man, distinct from the essence of the man, or even distinct from the powers or existence of that man. Now, when we say that "God is wise", we cannot mean this.

As earlier proven (Q.11), the essence of God is to exist, and He is ultimately simple by Nature. Therefore, we cannot possible "point" to something distinct from God's essence in the same way that we do when we call some person wise or well-mannered.

BUT....this cannot mean that we only speak of God equivocally, always the same word but never in the same sense, otherwise we cannot be said to ever say anything about God, and Aquinas clearly thinks that natural reason allows us to arrive at certain truths about God.

Therefore, we must use analogy.

Whereas equivocal terms are identical in form but diverse in meaning, and univocal terms are identical in form and meaning or idea, an analogous term is not identical in meaning, but neither is it diverse--it is, as Aquinas so aptly puts:

"sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum 
but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing" (13.5).

This third way allows for us to speak of God in terms that we know.

Aquinas saves the day, again.

Whether God is One?

In question 11 of the Summa, Aquinas discusses the unity of God. I will focus on article 3: Whether God is One? (Ia.11.3).

As usual, Aquinas begins the article with objections to the notion of God being One: "One, as the principle number, cannot be predicated of God". Furthermore, it is said in Corinthians that "there are many gods and many lords"(1 Cor 8:5).

But, as I have come to expect, Aquinas does have an answer to this fundamental question of the number of God, whether He is one or many.

"Respondeo dicendum quod Deum esse unum, ex tribus demonstratur"  (I answer that it can be shown from these three sources that God is One).

1. From God's simplicity we know that God is One. Aquinas gives an example of Socrates being a man: being a man is predicated of both Socrates and many other men, but being Socrates is predicated of only one, namely Socrates. In this way it is clear that Socrates is a particular member of the human race. But in the case of God, He is His own nature, as shown in Ia.3.3, and therefore it is impossible that many gods could exist. 
2. By definition and as proved in Ia.4.2, within God is contained the perfection of being. Now, if many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from one another otherwise they would not be many. Furthermore, there would be things that would belong to one which did not belong to another; if a privation, one of them would not be perfect, and if a perfection, then one of them would be without it as they must differ from one another necessarily. Therefore, it is impossible that many gods exist and we know that God must be one.
3. The unity of the world necessitates one first cause of order. We see that everything that exists serves some purpose and creates some harmony. A diverse cause or beginning would lead to a diverse end, leading to discord and chaos. This is not what we see in the world. Therefore, we know that what was the first cause was one, since it is the sole necessary cause. In this way we know that God is One.

Aquinas has done it again. He has a knack for taking very loaded objections to the foundation of the Catholic Faith and dismissing them concisely and completely. One key to remember is that this question does not stand alone, but it rests on previously defined truths that all serve as an "arsenal" for future questions.

But this is the beauty of what Aquinas accomplished.

He was able to start from the most basic--yet also profound--truth of God's existence and then move to uncovering what we can know about God. 

On a personal note, I recently decided who I would be working with on my thesis project here at TAMU. Dr. Robert Garcia and I will be working on the topic of natural kinds in contemporary analytic metaphysics; I am hoping to show how the Scholastics (like Aquinas) had a better metaphysical picture, so to speak, than the contemporary heavyweights like D.M. Armstrong.

I should be blogging rather regularly now, Wednesdays and Sundays. Anyways, until next time...cheers.

Goodness and Being: Question 5

In question 5 of prima pars (Ia), Aquinas discusses the relationship between goodness and being. I want to focus on article 1 and 3: whether goodness differs from being and whether every being is good, respectively.

The notion of the good is key for Aristotle and likewise for Aquinas as he himself draws so much from the Philosopher. The first objection is that since we call them by different names--goodness and being--then they must be different. Another objection comes from the idea that goodness can be had more or less whereas one either is or is not.

Aquinas answers: Augustinus dicit...quod inquantum sumus boni sumus (Augustine says that inasmuch as we exist we are good).

But what does this mean?

Goodness and being differ only in thought, according to Aquinas. We say that what is good is desirable; a thing is only desirable insofar as it is perfect, and a thing is perfect so far as it is actual. Nothing can be perfect if not actual, nothing can be good if not desirable, and we know that we desire things insofar as they are perfect.Therefore goodness is the same as being.

This might seem odd as a conclusion, and, admittedly, it is something that makes more sense given the context of the Summa. However, this idea that goodness and being are one and the same does shed light on the next article I will discuss: whether every being is good.

The main objection to every being being good is the existence of evil: "But some things are called evil. Therefore every being is not good" (Ia.5.3). On the face of it, this objection seems insurmountable, but Aquinas has an answer.

Everything that exists is either God or His creatures; everything that exists can be said to be in act, which as we found from article 1, means that every being is good insofar as it is in act. To quote Aquinas, "Unde sequitur omnes ens, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum est" (Hence is follows that every being as such is good) Ia.5.3.

But then what exactly is evil? It seems that it does, in fact, exist, so it must be accounted for.

Aquinas, following Aristotle, views evil as a lacking or privation. This is key to Catholic dogma as well as Aquinas' overall philosophical picture. It seems like a strange answer, but if you think about the "evils" we perceive in the world then it starts to make sense.

An eye is "evil" if it lacks to power to see; a man is called evil if he lacks some virtue; etc. Aquinas' solution is the result of a discussion of being, which he takes from Aristotle. Since being or actuality is inherently good, then it makes perfect sense to attribute non-being to the opposite of good, which we call evil. Therefore evil can only be understood as a privation as it has no existence.

Nothing is actually evil, since what is actual has being, and what has being is good insofar as it exists.

This understanding of evil is often criticized or rejected, but I think that this solution to the problem of evil not only has withstood the test of time, but that it also remains the only tenable view.

Cheers.